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Abstract Since industrial trade fair Hannover Messe
2011, the term BIndustrie 4.0^ has ignited a vision of a
new Industrial Revolution and has been inspiring a lively,
ongoing debate among theGerman public about the future
of work, and hence society, ever since. The discourse
around this vision of the future eventually spread to other
countries, with public awareness reaching a temporary
peak in 2016 when theWorld Economic Forum’s meeting
in Davos was held with the motto BMastering the Fourth
Industrial Revolution.^ How is it possible for a vision
originally established by threeGerman engineers to unfold
and bear fruit at a global level in such a short period of
time? This article begins with a summary of the key ideas
that are discussed under the label Industrie 4.0. The main
purpose, based on an in-depth discourse analysis, is to
debunk the myth about the origin of this powerful vision
and to trace the narrative back to the global economic
crisis in 2009 and thus to the real actors, central discourse
patterns, and hidden intentions of this vision of a new
Industrial Revolution. In conclusion, the discourse analy-
sis reveals that this is not a case of visioneering but one of
a future told, tamed, and traded.
Keywords Visioneering . Industry 4.0 . Industrie 4.0 .
Future . Anticipation
The German Debate on Industrie 4.0: a Case
of Visioneering?
Since 2011, the notion of BIndustrie 4.0^ has stimu-
lated an increasingly lively debate in German society.
Ini t ia l ly concerned with new technological
manufacturing options, the discourse has developed
into an ongoing and still-intensifying debate that is
reverberating through more and more spheres of so-
ciety. The future seems to occupy a prominent place
on the current discourse agenda, and in drawing on
the book Future Matters [1], the present article con-
siders whether this future is merely Btold^ (and by
whom) or whether it is also tamed and traded. Al-
though there is professional debate about Industrie
4.0 and the manufactural Internet in other countries
too, in Germany the numbers B4.0^ have developed
into a well-known meme that adorns conferences all
over the country, signaling fundamental discussions
on no less a topic than the future of work and the
future of society as a whole. What McCray [2] terms
visioneering inevitably comes to mind. The
marketing-style term Industrie 4.0 was invented and
promoted by three engineers: Henning Kagermann
(physicist and one of the founders of SAP), Wolfgang
Wahlster (professor of artificial intelligence), and
Wolf-Dieter Lukas (physicist and senior official at
the German Federal Ministry of Education and Re-
search). What they started in 2011 during a press
conference at the Hannover Messe and in 2016 be-
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(WEF) [3] meeting in Davos almost perfectly
matches what McCray defines as visioneering:
BVisioneering certainly embraces a probing and
exploratory approach to design as technically flu-
ent experts speculate at to what can be built. Yet
visioneering also involves the popularization of
ideas, the construction of networks of supporters,
and the cultivation of patrons^ ([2], p. 152).
The latter especially seems to be the ongoing mission
of Henning Kagermann, who, as the president of the
German National Academy of Science and Engineering
(acatech), successfully institutionalized, and continues
to maintain, a high-profile network of leading managers,
politicians, and other influential figures from employer
and business organizations and trade unions to promote
the vision of Industrie 4.0. And this notion was framed
as a vision right from the outset: the first strategic paper
that acatech published on Industrie 4.0 explicitly de-
scribes Industrie 4.0 as a Bvision^ that has to be shaped,
and draws a picture of what the Bfuture [will] look like
under Industrie 4.0^ ([4], p. 18–20). And this future,
although driven by technology, magically seems to
solve a host of societal problems that were once thought
to be insoluble—not only in Germany but across the
world:
BIn addition, Industrie 4.0 will address and solve
some of the challenges facing the world today
such as resource and energy efficiency, urban
production and demographic change. Industrie
4.0 enables continuous resource productivity and
efficiency gains to be delivered across the entire
value network. It allows work to be organized in a
way that takes demographic change and social
factors into account. Smart assistance systems
release workers from having to perform routine
tasks, enabling them to focus on creative, value-
added activities. In view of the impending short-
age of skilled workers, this will allow older
workers to extend their working lives and remain
productive for longer. Flexible work organization
will enable workers to combine their work, private
lives, and continuing professional development
more effectively, promoting a better work-life
balance^ ([4], p. 5; emphasis in original).
However, the strategy paper on Industrie 4.0 is not
very specific about how its stated goals, which are in
part mutually incompatible, can be achieved. The
propagated utopia repeatedly upholds the mantra-like
dictum that Industrie 4.0 is completely human-centered
and will therefore not pave the way towards deserted,
fully automated factories.
With Industrie 4.0, new and ostensibly unheard-of
technical possibilities are being touted. Without a doubt,
the technical innovations being discussed are fascinat-
ing, and the whole enterprise cannot be understood,
much less realized, without giving them due attention.
Yet, we must always differentiate between the real and
speculated effects of technology, between serious dis-
course and media hype, between true innovation and old
hat. A command of basic knowledge about IT systems
and production-process technology is often lacking,
although it would surely aid objective analysis, as would
familiarity with the state of the art of work organization
and the intra-logistics of factory assembly. Technical
expertise of this sort would quickly demystify much of
the current hype.
But even those who coined the term Industrie 4.0 are
astonishingly vague about the technical details of the
big, visionary picture they paint in the paper cited above.
Despite their technical backgrounds, the three engineers
seem to deliberately avoid describing technical details
linked to concrete applications of Industrie 4.0 on the
shop floor and instead indulge in colorful visions of the
future. And this is why the vision of Industrie 4.0 lacks
one central feature of McCray’s definition of
visioneering, which in his words B(…) requires more
than imaginative and sweeping ideas for how new tech-
nologies might dramatically reshape society. It also re-
quires some application of technical skills, knowledge,
and calculations to press forward toward the technolog-
ical future. Engineering, after all, culminates in building
things. Successful visioneering demands that paper,
pencils, and the speaker’s podium be exchanged for
the hammer, forge, and welder’s arch^ ([2], p. 261,
emphasis in original).
Nevertheless, this article cannot take up the tasks,
important as they are, of elaborating on the technical
phenomena associated with Industrie 4.0, the tech-
nological ontologies that underlie them, or their
sociological implications. Even a discussion of tech-
nical issues alone would fill more pages than appro-
priate for a single article. Instead, this article uses
the now quite expansive reach and the loud buzz
surrounding Industrie 4.0 as a jumping-off point for
an in-depth examination of the strategies and actors
behind it all.
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The buzz surrounding Industrie 4.0 has put the spot-
light back on industrial production and industrial em-
ployment after it was very nearly relegated to historical
texts. For many years and until just recently, industrial
production was Bold economy,^ both for policymakers
and academic researchers. Production and assembly
work was written off as being in permanent decline, just
industrial residue in a post-industrial society. Although
knowledge about these work environments was current
in society and research as recently as just 20 years ago, it
has since faded like old photographs. Thus, I will con-
centrate in this article on the industrial core and its
immediate edges, to the neglect of equally important
processes that have initiated new forays into digitaliza-
tion such as crowd sourcing, micro work, and the
emerging sharing economy (which incidentally have
played similar roles in developments in non-industrial
sectors such as logistics and health care). Nor will I
delve into the issues of increasing vulnerability as a
result of ever-more complex data acquisition and aggre-
gation, although these are surely very important topics
for employment-based societies and for businesses. This
narrow focus intentionally replicates the narrow con-
fines in which the discussion about Industrie 4.0 itself
has taken place. Doing so makes it possible to analyze
thoroughly and critically the discourse and the phenom-
ena it addresses.
My observations begin at the purported discursive
roots of Industrie 4.0—in the assumption that it arose in
reaction to a new quality of technological development
and that its intellectual home is above all in Germany,
where the economy is still highly influenced by engi-
neering and industry.
The BIndustrie 4.0: Understanding a Seemingly
Technical DebateB section provides an introduction for
readers with only cursory knowledge of Industrie 4.0
and provides the necessary background for the actual
analysis, which begins in the BFuture told: a Global
Strategic DiscourseB section with a review of the ori-
gins, progression, intention, and actors of a discourse
that has a lot more to do with economics than
technology.
On the basis of this critical discourse analysis, and
drawing on the theories of Barbara Adam’s and Chris
Groves’ Future Matters, BFuture told: a Global Strategic
Discourse,BFuture traded: the False Hope of a New
Source of Unbridled Growth,B and „Future tamed: the
Global reorganisation of workB sections elaborate the
central argument of the paper that Industrie 4.0 (or,
rather, that which is referred to by this name in Germa-
ny) should not be interpreted as an example of
Bvisioneering.^ With respect to the German debate on
Industrie 4.0, it is shown that German engineers are not
the driving force behind the debate, nor are they inter-
ested in Bbuilding things^ (as noted above). McCray’s
visioneers use their visions to raise money and attract
supporters and thereby achieve their technical goals.
Their visions are a means to an end, or, as Nordmann
puts it: BWhat visioneering aims for is to exhibit a
compelling causal link between a state A (technological
work-in-progress) and a state B (a future so desirable as
to mandate its realization) (…)^ [5].
The empirical basis for this article is a discourse
analysis of a wide range of texts published between
2009 and 2015, which follows the Bsociology of knowl-
edge approach to discourse (SKAD)^ [6]. More than
220 publications were chosen and, in line with the
SKAD, were analyzed with regard to the explicit opin-
ions they contained and the economic interests, social
relations, and politics of knowledge that the future vi-
sions in this material addressed.
Following Adam and Groves, I argue in this article
that Industrie 4.0 should be understood as a process that
works in a manner contrary to the way in which it is
often conceived. Industrie 4.0 is not a debate about Bthe
embedded, embodied, contextual future^ but a phenom-
enon of a Bdecontextualized future emptied of content,
which is open to exploration and exploitation, calcula-
tion and control^ ([1], p. 2).
The three main sections will discuss the debate on
Industrie 4.0 as an intentional future told from Adam’s
and Groves’ analytical perspective. The BFuture told: a
Global Strategic DiscourseB section elaborates on the
manner in which agenda-building and big narratives
have been deliberately initiated by influential actors on
a global scale. The BFuture traded: the False Hope of a
New Source of Unbridled GrowthB section proceeds to
show how Industrie 4.0 could be seen as a form of
traded future: a future that only appears utopian to a
superficial regard. In terms of certain well-known eco-
nomic considerations that are highly pertinent today, this
future fails to live up to its self-imposed utopian aspira-
tions. The overall aim of Industrie 4.0 seems not to be
the development of visioneering forms of trading that
would be genuinely utopian and truly novel (in gener-
ating post-growth prosperity, for instance, or sustainably
using global resources and promoting a more equal
distribution of wealth) but to ensure the persistence of
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the current economic spatio-temporal logic. In order for
this traded future to be established, production and
distribution processes not only have to be digitized and
integrated into a global network, but—as the „Future
tamed: the Global reorganisation of workB section
shows—also need to be restructured from the global
level down to every workplace and shop floor. Discus-
sions of Industrie 4.0 and the vision of a Fourth Indus-
trial Revolution therefore also tend to paint a picture of a
tamed future. The BIndustrie 4.0: a Future Told, Traded,
and TamedB section brings together the key results of
the discourse analysis. These results are contrasted with
an interpretation of the German debate on Industrie 4.0
that at first glance appears accurate, namely, one that
construes this debate as a nationally centralized and
technologically driven case of visioneering. The article
closes with some theoretical reflections on the signifi-
cance of the sociomateriality of technology and the
societal and economic role of human labor in realizing
visions of the future.
Industrie 4.0: Understanding a Seemingly Technical
Debate
After being introduced to a wide audience for the first
time during the Hannover Trade Fair in 2011, the
Industrie 4.0 concept migrated quickly out of the spe-
cialized discourse to become a widely recognized catch
word in the popular vernacular. It succeeded in putting
industrial production, a dead topic for many years, back
in the limelight. What had been written off as Bold
economy^ became celebrated as the nucleus of an IT-
based revolution. Industrie 4.0 was elevated to a central
strategic goal for economic and industrial policy [7].
The evolving discourse around Industrie 4.0 became
very diverse, complex, and interest-driven as the list of
technical options associated with the label was length-
ened almost daily. For the initiators of the debate,
Industrie 4.0 is nothing less than the fourth industrial
revolution: BThe first three industrial revolutions came
about as a result of mechanisation, electricity and IT.
Now, the introduction of the Internet of Things and
Services into the manufacturing environment is usher-
ing in a fourth industrial revolution. In the future, busi-
nesses will establish global networks that incorporate
their machinery, warehousing systems and production
facilities in the shape of Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPS)^ ([4], p.5; emphasis in original).
The terms Internet of Things (IOT) and cyber-
physical systems indicate what is at stake here. It is
about networking digitally the maximum possible
number of elements involved in production process-
es, support services, and logistics. In this way, the
material melds with the digital. Everything from a
local production line to global value chains is to be
globally networked and locally regulated, as in the
often-cited example of highly customizable products.
All manipulable objects in the production process are
to be fitted with data transponders that communicate
position and production status to the machines doing
the processing work. In Bsmart factories^ built on
these principles and in the Bsmart service welt^ that
emerges afterward [8], the restrictions of traditional
mass production can be overcome. The idea is that
products will be custom-manufactured in response to
individual needs and only on demand.
At every point on such complex production and
value chains, an immense amount of data is created,
even today. In the course of CPS, the volume of data
that has to be integrated will increase exponentially.
Not only the elements being moved through the pro-
duction process but also all of the sensors and acti-
vators of all the machines and plants involved gener-
ate status data continuously, and this data stream may
even one day be extended to driverless systems that
deliver the finished product right to the customer’s
door. This is big data indeed, and not only data about
human consumption or health behaviors but also data
about machines and human-machine interaction such
as the longevity of machine parts or optimal delivery
routes. Note that all this is not simply about
stretching an additional layer of data over already-
existing databanks and applications. Other technical
developments also play a central role in the Industrie
4.0 scenarios being discussed:
& To date, we are familiar only with large stationary or
axial industrial robots. In the future, light robots,
two-armed robots, and adaptive Brobotics^ will
make new forms of human-machine interaction pos-
sible, making the use of robots feasible for tasks that
cannot now be profitably automated.
& Completely new production technologies are also
being considered. BAdditive manufacturing
processes^ or 3D-printing makes decentralized, on-
demand production of individual parts possible. Ap-
proaches such as Brapid tooling^ change the way
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businesses make tools and thus also change the
work process at the point of production.
& Finally, Bwearables^ also come into play. These are
digital devices that can be affixed directly on
workers and can include anything from data glasses
that display information during maintenance work
to the smart glove that sends a warning signal when
a worker assembles something incorrectly or as-
sesses assembly workers’ stress levels by monitor-
ing their vital signs.
& This is by no means an exhaustive list of possible
technical applications relevant for Industrie 4.0.
These also include all of the technically supported
capabilities so well known to most of us from our
private use of smartphones, tablets, apps, and social
media. All of these technical capabilities and more
can be integrated into the factory workplace.
This quick review includes only a small part of the
technological tour de force supposedly awaiting us in
the future, and it makes little sense to elaborate further
on the important technical details that underlie them.
The sheer expanse of possibilities is overwhelming, but
a healthy skepticism is called for because all of the
speculation so far is in fact based on long-established
technologies that are being improved incrementally. The
often cited Bteach-in^ method of intuitive robot pro-
gramming, for example, has been in industrial use for
decades. Similarly, the use of data generated by ma-
chines and plants for remote or preventive maintenance
is by no means new. Even the digitalized factory is
virtually standard practice in mass production today.
Large automobile manufactures, for example, give each
chassis on an assembly line its own barcode. The
barcode is affixed at what is appropriately called its
Bchristening^ in industry jargon before it moves on
towards its Bmarriage^ with an engine block. Inciden-
tally, ITcompanies have been working for years (not yet
with complete success) on methods to create an unbro-
ken product data stream through all points of the product
life cycle, from construction to disassembly.
Yet, some scenarios are being imagined that are
genuinely futuristic. For example, 3D-printing, although
nearly universally overhyped, is still in its infancy for
many industrial uses. And whether the decentralized,
self-directed manufacture of products in lots of one will
ever prove to be economically sustainable and techni-
cally sufficient remains to be demonstrated. Making
things additionally difficult is the fact that we have not
even begun to resolve all the security and privacy issues
that accompany these envisaged innovations. Nor is the
needed technical infrastructure in place. Creating a suf-
ficiently fast internet might well necessitate abandoning
net neutrality, which would bring up political issues, and
solving these would require negotiation among societal
actors, not just a technical fix.
As the discussion above makes clear, there is no
single Industrie 4.0. What innovations will be adapted
in which branches and by which companies depends on
the specific settings as defined by factors including but
not limited to the degree of automation, product com-
plexity, value chains, and production technology. We
have little idea about these factors, even in today’s
economy. Our current knowledge of the presence and
influence of these factors in German industrial produc-
tion is based on speculation. No official statistics are
kept, for example, on how many people work at hybrid
(half-automated, half-manual) assembly stations or
which companies use anticipatory, data-supportedmain-
tenance. Given the lack of robust data, we must be very
cautious with prognoses.
One can reasonably argue that the scenarios propa-
gated in the Industrie 4.0 discourse may also be subject
to systematic data bias. The tasks performed by indus-
trial workers in advanced industrial societies are in fact
highly diverse and complex, yet the available empirical
labor market datasets that attempt to measure work tasks
reproduce this complexity only crudely and superficial-
ly. This problem affects Carl Benedikt Frey andMichael
A. Osborne’s often cited study [9] and German labor
market research alike. The available surveys falsely
assume that practically every human task on a machine
is simple and routine and can thus be easily replaced by
automation. This is more than a pragmatic simplifica-
tion—it is a misleading assumption devoid of theoretical
justification [10]. Moreover, simple logical reasoning
also cautions us to be skeptical. If we take the dis-
course’s claim of immanent Brevolutionary^ and
Bdisruptive^ developments at face value, we actually
have zero basis to make robust predictions of future
events, as one can only predict the course of future
events on the basis of previous experience. On top of
this come plausible economic objections: innovations
have never prevailed in industrial manufacturing simply
because they were technically feasible. Were this other-
wise, Germany would now be the home of a vibrant
textile industry that had incrementally modernized its
production technology for generations, given that textile
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manufacturing is the textbook case of the possibilities of
extensive automation. This is, however, not the case.
Apparently, it was more profitable for most German
textile companies to use low-tech methods in low-
wage countries rather than high-tech methods in high-
wage Germany.
In sum, there are data-bias, logical, and economic
reasons to be skeptical of any vision of the future de-
rived from quantitative projections of labor market
trends and based on a single-minded consideration of
what innovations are now technically feasible. These
kinds of Industrie 4.0 scenarios are short-sighted be-
cause they are not informed by qualitative insights into
the reality of the working world and corporate strategy,
e.g., ignoring the role of humans in human-robot inter-
action [11]. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that these
visions do have a certain degree of influence. Tomor-
row’s reality need not be today’s reality; it can always be
changed by powerful economic and political actors. The
next section discusses these actors and their intentions.
Future Told: a Global Strategic Discourse
The Industrie 4.0 discourse is often shortsightedly fo-
cused on technical issues and national boundaries, de-
spite the fact that its origin and development were
motivated more by economics than technology and
influenced more by the international strategic environ-
ment than by national economic policies. The pervasive
presence in 2015 of talk about Industrie 4.0 does not
causally result from society having reached a new stage
of technological development. It is first and foremost the
result of professionally managed agenda setting. From
the perspective of discourse analysis, this is a clear case
of successful public relations.
The origin of the Industrie 4.0 discourse and all the
ideas that were present at its creation were decisive in
the formation of the discourse as it exists today because
they vitally influenced the initial direction and content
of prognostications about change. In Germany, the ex-
pectation that Industrie 4.0 will spur immense growth is
closely linked to the strong export and innovation per-
formance of German machine tool, plant equipment,
and motor manufacturers. Not by accident do these
companies play a starring role as providers of infrastruc-
ture in Industrie 4.0 scripts. Germany’s competitive
advantages and the relatively high share of added value
in industrial production favored a view of Industrie 4.0
that is filtered through the lens of national interest. The
key actors very much want to see the global networking
of manufacturing to be realized in such a way as to
generate positive economic effects for the German econ-
omy. With a view toward global competition, especially
with the USA and China, Industrie 4.0 has even been
characterized as the question that will decide the fate of
German industry [12]. Nonetheless, although the spe-
cific concept may have been a German invention, the
idea that underlies it is not. An international debate that
paralleled discussions occurring in (West) Germany is
clearly evident.
Between 2009 and 2010, a number of widely noticed
studies were published, mainly by business consultants.
Written in the shadow of the international financial
crisis, they fueled a rediscovery of the significance of
the industrial sector despite previous long-term trends of
deindustrialization. They expressed concern over the
flagging competitiveness of established and once-
strong industrial economies (Germany, Japan, USA)
relative to the emerging industrial economies, especially
those in Asia. The following messages played a prom-
inent role in this discussion.
& An elaborate comparison of the complexity of na-
tional economies [13] ranked Germany first of 129
countries. Disappointingly for Germany, however, a
later publication using the same dataset to estimate
future economic potential placed Germany at the
bottom of the ranking, near Yemen.
& The international corporate accounting and consult-
ing firm Deloitte created the Shift Index [14]. This is
a three-part strategy that conjoined, probably for the
first time, many of the elements typical to the na-
tional Industrie 4.0 discourse. First, the strategy calls
for the creation of decentralized steering mecha-
nisms for new forms of collaboration and a Bflow
of knowledge.^ Second, these are to be based on
digital infrastructure and even greater market liber-
alization. Third, economic and political actors are
advised to cooperate in the realization of these goals
on so-called platforms [14].
& Germanywas ranked 8th on theGlobalManufactur-
ing Competitiveness Index [15]. Although Germany
remains technically advanced, the Chinese industry
has clearly caught up and now even exceeds its
German rivals in the area of wind and solar power
technology. High labor costs and bureaucratic hur-
dles for start-ups were cited as demerits.
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& Germany was ranked 13th on the Enabling Trade
Index in 2010, good enough to make it the Bbest
performer^ among the large national economies.
Germany placed well ahead of the USA, which
had ranked 16th a year earlier but fell to 19th in
the 2010 ranking [16].
Influenced by these studies and their strategic recom-
mendations, three initiatives were launched during the
World Economic Forum (WEF) in January 2011: a task
force, the BFuture of Manufacturing^ project, and the
Global Agenda Council on Advanced Manufacturing
[17]. Participants in the new initiatives included corpo-
rate representatives from Volkswagen, Bosch, and
Daimler. Among this group was also Siegfried
Russwurm of Siemens AG, who later became one of
the spokespersons of BPlatform Industrie 4.0,^ founded
in 2013. These WEF organizations see themselves as a
Bplatform for informed dialog between senior business
leaders and policy-makers.^ To kick off activities at the
WEF level, they soon agreed to promote a Bdata-driven
narrative^ in support of Bthe strategic use of public
policy as an enabler of economic development^ [17],
and 3 months later in April 2001, the term Industrie 4.0
was floated at the Hannover Trade Fair as noted above
[18]. After this successful beginning, the discourse nev-
er quieted down. It even seeped into the popular vernac-
ular. In the process, political actors at the European,
national, and federal-state levels started to play in ex-
emplary fashion the Benabling^ role imagined for them
by the WEF. In addition, all of the large corporate
consulting firms have taken up the narrative as initiated
and quantitatively undergirded by the WEF, contribut-
ing their own data and details. The plot forged in Swit-
zerland bore fruit.
Ironically, the same consulting firms that joined the
vanguard recommending intentional deindustrialization
now point to the industrial sector not only as the core
element of the value chain but also as the essential prereq-
uisite for the preservation of Bhigh-quality services^ in the
national or regional economy [19]. In a study of how to
create an Industrie 4.0 ecosystem, Roland Berger Strategy
Consultants offered up a crystal-clear plan centered
around the promotion of Industrie 4.0 as a European idea
and legislation to fund start-up friendly infrastructure [19].
These appeals are of course addressed to European and
national-level politicians.
These initiatives have resonated greatly, as superbly
exemplified by the Industrie 4.0 discourse in Germany. It
can hardly be denied that political actors are carrying out
their part of the plan dutifully. Note that this assertion
requires no need to assume the influence of some kind
of causal force Bfrom above,^ guiding the dynamics of
national public discourses and ensuring their success. The
conjunction of diverse personal alliances, the influence of
corporate consultancies, and the economy-driven world-
view shared for years by politicians and corporate leaders
are fully sufficient to ensure that reality remains consistent
with the master plan.
One thing, at least, is clear. Industrie 4.0 got its
discursive wings not primarily from the rise of new
technical possibilities but rather from economic
Bexigencies^ as identified by economic elites. In the
initiation of this elite discourse, German business
leaders did not play the key role, although without a
doubt Germany is a strategic and internationally valued
power player, and the members of the BPlattform
Industrie 4.0^ are surely proud to have kept the German
spelling of their group from being Anglicized. Looking
back from today’s perspective, however, we see that
Germany was neither the inventor nor the protagonist
in a narrative that other actors brought into play with the
intention of reinventing the world of industrial
production.
Future Traded: the False Hope of a New Source
of Unbridled Growth
In elaborating their notion of a Btraded future,^ Adam
and Groves distinguish between an abstract, an open,
and an empty future. The abstract future, Bbelonging to
everyone and no one,^ inherently calls for—and contra-
dicts—the concept of an open future, which is described
as Bbelonging to some degree to human beings them-
selves; as produced through human intervention sup-
ported by an awareness of freedom and potentiality^
([1], p. 57). Since the concepts of the abstract future
and the open future are entangled with each other and
fraught with numerous tensions, they were increasingly
replaced with what the authors call an Bempty future^:
the Bcentral problem associated with the open future, i.e.
which potential future to choose, is solved using math-
ematical methods to quantify the prospective gains and
losses entailed by each of the alternatives.^ Adam and
Groves identify both a domain—Bthe appearance of an
autonomous market economy towards the end of the
18th century^—and a set of willing actors—Ban
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independent social science called economics^ that joint-
ly laid the Bfoundations (…) for the cultural dominance
of the empty future^ ([1], p. 57). Both the market
economy and modern economic science subsequently
acquired an ally that has helped bridge both spheres and
enhance their mutual interaction: consulting firms are
introduced here as the main drivers of the narrative,
promising a future of everlasting growth as long as
society willingly follows the path and pace they set
down.
In the origin and course of the public debate on
Industrie 4.0, we see that certain economic expectations
attained priority. The focus was never on technical in-
novation, which was always treated merely as the means
for securing greater economic growth. And indeed, the
projections of the potential growth effects of Industrie
4.0 are very rosy. Some analysts have ventured the
prognostication that Industrie 4.0 will bring economic
growth for Germany in the amount of 78 billion euros
by 2025 and a growth rate of up to 30% in some
branches such as machine tools and plant construction
[20]. The methods used to arrive at these projections,
however, are questionable. Those 78 billion euros sup-
posedly represent the isolated effect of Industrie 4.0, that
is, its effect separate from growth due to other factors.
The study picked out six especially innovative econom-
ic branches for analysis: chemicals, automobiles, ma-
chine tools and plant construction, electrical equipment,
agribusiness and forestry, and information and commu-
nication technology.1 For all other branches and under
the assumption of such growth rates, the study adds a
50% growth multiplier to arrive at the prediction that
Industrie 4.0 will by itself spur economic growth in the
amount of 267.5 billion euros for the German economy
alone [20]. Upon closer examination of the study’s
methods, it is clear that these are black-box prognoses,
although admittedly this does not prevent the research
unit of the Deutsche Bank from re-using them uncriti-
cally [22].
The numbers sound fantastically good and are hap-
pily accepted in the halls of politics. However, a recent
systematic comparison of studies assessing the potential
impact of Industrie 4.0 criticized their lack of method-
ological rigor and showed that while Industrie 4.0
would indeed be likely to spur economic growth, the
expense of the necessary investments would most likely
cancel out any overall growth effect [23]. Advocates
apparently overlook something every entry-level man-
ager knows: investment costs have to be subtracted
from revenue in a correct profit calculation. But as long
as economic growth is measured solely as gross domes-
tic product, even poor investments count as growth.
Nonetheless, the statistical legerdemain intended to
make Industrie 4.0 shine is not intentional duplicity, it
is just another example of a pervasive flaw in business
school thinking referred to as Bthe capitalist’s
dilemma.^ In their article with this title, published in
the Harvard Business Manager of all places [24],
Christensen and van Bever take their own colleagues
to task and argue against a promoting innovation at any
cost. Instead, we must differentiate between Bmarket-
creating innovations^ and Befficiency innovations.^
Most Industrie 4.0 scenarios link growth projections
to increased flexibility of production with supposed
concomitant productivity gains. This, however, is just
another form of efficiency innovation, unsustainable
from the Christensen and van Bever perspective. Great-
er efficiency serves, they argue, only to eliminate jobs
(or to prevent new jobs from being necessary) and to
generate additional capital. Yet, corporations already
have more capital than they want to invest. The authors
estimate that corporations are currently sitting on more
than 1.6 trillion dollars in unused capital. This money
should be invested in market-creating innovations.
The worrisome state of the global environment alone
would justify a worldwide negative growth program,
but if the Industrie 4.0 vision becomes reality, there is
no indication that any of its aspects would run counter to
the dominant ideology of economic growth. It would
only serve to heighten what a German sociologist calls
the dual crisis of economy and ecology [25]. Sure,
insofar as Industrie 4.0 means on-demand-only produc-
tion, fewer natural resources would be wasted, but a
powerful reason to doubt that Industrie 4.0 would ever
be green can be found on the assembly lines of every
major automobile manufacturer today. Even on these
lines, designed for high-volume production, every auto-
mobile is individually identifiable from its Bchristening^
onward and can thus be fitted at every point of assembly
with individualized options. Thus, production in series
1 McKinsey is not as optimistic in their assessment of the growth
potential in industrial equipment production. Unlike its predecessors,
the fourth industrial revolution is not expected to be characterized by
thewholesale replacement of the physical means of production. Rather,
it will proceed more similarly to electrification. Many plants and
machines will simply be enhanced with sensors, networks, and big
data. Less than half are expected to be completely replaced, and the
turnover is expected to occur over a longer timespan [21].
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even now is by no means to be equated with rolling out
identical products en masse. The status quo of today’s
data network and assembly line technologies has ad-
vanced enough already to allow companies to produce
individual automobiles only after receiving a specific
order from an identifiable customer. No doubt, the tech-
nology associated with Industrie 4.0 would improve the
capabilities of such a production regime. All supply
process could be integrated into self-directed,
decentralized value chains optimized for the manufac-
ture of products in lots of one such as to eliminate
overproduction. Yet, as long as the logic of unbridled
growth remains dominant—for example in the dogma
of Boverall equipment efficiency^ (OEE) and its dictate
to maximize the utilization of plant and equipment—the
new capabilities of self-directed CPS will not be
employed to improve environmental outcomes.
An additional consideration is the unheard-of growth
that Industrie 4.0 is expected to spur through the inte-
gration of the Internet of things. A prognosis ventured
by the corporate consultancy McKinsey arrived at the
figure of over 11 trillion dollars per year (!) in additional
growth through 2025 [26]. However, this calculation
assumes a price for rare elements, essential for many
IoT components, that is already much too low from an
ecological perspective, and the study further assumes
that the prices for other essential components such as
micro-electromechanical sensors will sink by 30 to 70%
[26]. Imagine, however, the consequences of such a
dramatic fall in prices in terms of the tide of global
electronic garbage, which grew globally by 42 million
tons in 2014 alone.
Industrie 4.0 and the Internet of Things certainly are
feasible technologies and could make a welcome con-
tribution in the near future to the reduction of resource
consumption. Yet, they are hardly likely to break the
dogma of growth and will instead only greatly exacer-
bate the dual crisis of economy and ecology.
A supposedly dangerous threat to economic growth
remains one of the main diagnoses undergirding the
WEF’s Badvanced manufacturing^ strategy [17], the
most serious problem being the US economy. The BBig
Shift Index,^ put out by Deloitte in 2009 for the first
time, showed that return of assets (ROA) in the USA has
been in continual decline for the past four decades
despite some work productivity gains [14]. The data
were positive only for the highly subsidized aeronautics
and defense industries and for consumer goods produc-
tion. This noteworthy finding could be interpreted as
empirical support for Marx’s hypothesis of the inherent
tendency of profit rates to fall as a consequence of
increasing technical automation. This leads to a reduc-
tion of the significance of human labor for value crea-
tion and is for Marx one of the central mechanisms
pushing capitalism to its inevitable end. Deloitte would
not concur. They explain the cause of falling profits
differently:
…[C]reative talent continues to capture increas-
ingly disproportionate returns in terms of total
compensation relative to the rest of the labor
force…. On the customer side, new generations
entering the marketplace appear to be more will-
ing to exercise their market power to switch to
products and services…. The growing power of
creative talent and customers … helps to resolve
the mystery of why ROA is declining so markedly
at the same time that productivity improvements
continue to occur ([14], p. 12; emphasis in
original).
This explanation is surprising because it ignores
standard explanations for the fall of profitability,
including for example increased global competition,
disruptions of financial markets, the most recent
crisis, and mismanagement. Instead, Deloitte argues
(without providing empirical evidence) that the
cause of the problem lies in the influence of workers
in the creative sectors and in consumers’ purchasing
power. The first group, which stands at the upper
echelon of the qualification pyramid, earn too much,
even as consumers prefer cheaper services and
goods. Apparently, the argument is that companies
in innovative markets must pay their workers high
wages without being able to pass these costs on to
the consumer because of stiff price competition.
For Deloitte, the right response is not Bto
squeeze creative talent and customers in a zero
sum battle to capture more of the existing pie [but
rather] to discover new ways of organizing and
operating to more effectively create and capture
new value^ (ibid.). The consultants do not target
disproportionally high salaries of creative workers
for change. Rather, they recommend that corporate
managers organize new and efficient ways of valo-
rizing human work. From this perspective, then,
human work in the spheres of production and con-
sumption has gained significance for the promotion
of growth and the generation of profits.
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Future Tamed: the Global Reorganization of Work
For decades, jobs have been replaced by automated
systems in a continual process of labor rationalization.
In the 1980s, armies of typesetters and analog print
workers were swept aside by new printing technologies.
And who today remembers shop-floor secretaries? Or
the fact that Bbank teller^ once used to be a synonym for
secure employment? Or the days when more humans
than robots worked on Germany’s automotive assembly
lines? These and other profound changes in work orga-
nization came about relatively unnoticed, and the topic
of technology-induced unemployment has returned now
to the public agenda only because of new, Industrie 4.0
production technologies. These technologies are, with
good reason, thought to have the potential to completely
transform productive labor as we know it. Intelligent
algorithms and Big Data could replace qualified knowl-
edge workers, at least partially, and inexpensive light
robots are likely to be used in production environments
that have so far resisted automation. And incidentally, if
the driverless car ever becomes a practical reality, it will
dramatically change all economic activities dependent
on package delivery and small-scale transportation.
Furthermore, Adam and Groves show how and why
futures have to be not just told but also tamed ([1], 39–
56). In predicting the future, and a fortiori in creating it,
human beings have to cope with its underlying pitfalls,
particularly those of uncertainty and mortality. While
ancient societies were able to embed this endeavor in
rituals and/or delegate it to divine authorities, modern
societies—whose complexities and enhanced velocities
of change produce greater uncertainty on a potentially
larger existential scale—cannot rely on ancient modes
of coping, but require different ways of taming the
possible downsides of the future.
At an individual level, grave uncertainties and mor-
tality serve to reduce life to the level of mere existence,
while at societal and historical levels, the accumulation
of risks serves to endanger humanity as a whole. Be-
tween these existential dimensions of mortality, in the
sphere of the economy and labor, existence and non-
existence are translated into doing business and the
dying of business on the one hand, and into having or
not having a job on the other. As a future told, Industrie
4.0 also needs to tame the uncertainties and risks posed
by Bmortality^ for business and jobs.
In light of the potential magnitude of the predicted
economic and societal changes, then, it is no surprise
that a large number of studies have addressed the man-
ner in which automation has the effect of eliminating
jobs, where Bjob elimination^ may well mean the elim-
ination of all jobs in any given production environment
through the replacement of human workers with intelli-
gent things [9, 27–29]. As noted above in the BIndustrie
4.0: understanding a seemingly technical debateB sec-
tion, in reflecting on the potential large-scale transfor-
mation of labor, the fundamental methodological prob-
lems inherent too much of the Industrie 4.0 debate
should not be downplayed. Nor should we neglect the
fact, also noted above, that current prognoses about the
possible effects of new technology on employment are
often diametrically opposed to one another. Note the
contradictions for example in debates on workforce re-
qualification versus workforce dequalification, or on
whether automation liberates workers from repetitive
tasks so that they can be more creative or rather makes
them wholly redundant.
Putting aside these objections for the moment, howev-
er, it is also clear that to focus narrowly on individual
technical options, on current methods of effecting a divi-
sion of labor, or on the kinds of job tasks now in use
misses the main point completely. And that is how the
visions of Industrie 4.0 are taming the risks and uncertain-
ty of business right down to the shop floor. Again, without
ancient gods to turn to, when modern societies envision
the Fourth Industrial Revolution, they rely on something
they invented during the first one and have been optimiz-
ing ever since: the (seemingly) perfect plan—a plan that
promises both: to anticipate possible uncertainties and to
provide tools to cope with any minor ones that may be left
over. Today, these tools comprise all forms of organiza-
tional standardization [30]. With Industrie 4.0, these con-
cepts of planning and standards have to be propelled into a
globally connected economy and have to be transformed
to fit in, as we see now as we return to the discourse
analysis on Industrie 4.0.
Current visions of a future with globally networked
economic actors re-conceptualize the working world on
a much, much larger scale, placing the management of
all global value chains at the front and center of discus-
sion. The goal is to create structures free from local
connections, regional expertise, and labor market-
specific configurations. This is about creating globally
standardized, networked production and service struc-
tures that enable the flexible and self-directed collabo-
ration of fixed and variable capital. One might discount
this project as a utopian dream of capitalist visionaries
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with no basis in reality. Yet, a careful examination of the
discourse as reconstructed in the sections above makes
clear that the projects being discussed contain specific
goals that are even now close to implementation. Due to
space limitations, we offer below only one—highly
relevant—piece of evidence to support this argument:
the WEF’s use of the old Copy EXACTLY strategy as a
case in point, illustrating the feasibility of its
recommendations.
At first glance, it is confusing that the WEF uses a
strategy called BCopy EXACTLY!^ pioneered long ago
in the 1980s, as a case in point to illustrate its vision of
the future [31]. Why indeed did the WEF choose to
revisit this old strategy, initially developed by Intel?
[32].2 It is worth studying the original project at length
because it provides insight into the mentality of the Intel
managers who invented and implemented it. Their core
idea, addressed to the problem of how to best expand
manufacturing capacity globally, was to build multiple
exact copies of running manufacturing lines on different
sites around the world. BStated in its simplest form,
everything which might affect the process, or how it is
to run, is to be copied down to the finest detail, unless it
is… physically impossible to do so…^ ([32], p. 2). As it
turned out, virtually nothing physical proved impossible
to replicate—right down to the smallest details such as
the color of assembly workers’ gloves. The problems
that Intel encountered trying to set up an exact replica of
anAmerican factory on European sites were immaterial:
BMaking a philosophical statement is obviously much
easier than implementing it within a large team of R&D
and manufacturing engineers^ [32]. Intel’s European
technicians and engineers, headstrong and better trained
than their American colleagues, were irritated by the
directive to merely copy an American production line.
This offended their professional ethos, which places a
high value on continual improvement. An analysis of
the project concluded by citing an astounded American
Intel manager’s observation that European educational
systems train graduates to think independently, which
meant that the order to copy felt to them like an order to
Bcheat^ ([32], p. 3). This impasse spurred a corporate
learning process. For neutralizing opposition to their
strategy, based on the professional identities of their
European employers, Intel eventually came up with a
four-stage implementation system that made
concessions to local creativity but still created assembly
lines that exactly copied American production lines.
What is noteworthy about Intel’s implementation
process was that the regionally rooted skills of the
headstrong European engineer were neither played
down in their significance nor technically substituted.
The solution was to shut down those aspects of engi-
neering knowledge that are regional and unique only
temporarily during the copying phase. Later, when the
line is up and running, the copying phase ends, and the
regional expertise of the European engineer is re-
activated and indeed may be massively rewarded. Ideas
for improvement that have proven effective in one plant
are implemented in all similar facilities worldwide
(these had to be implemented within 1 week!). Thus,
identical production facilities worldwide means not only
that the benefits of engineering know-how are no longer
limited to local plants but also that the total sum of
actionable production improvements worldwide in-
creases without increasing the number of technicians
overall. BIn effect, the number of engineers per process
step or per area for improvement is increased, as is the
number of improvement ideas generatedB ([32], p. 5).
The system extracts the innovative capacity of local
engineers from specific regional environments, thus
increasing their effectiveness, while at the same time
guaranteeing an especially high flexibility in produc-
tion: BWith three sites running the exact same process,
products were easily transferred back and forth with no
re-qualification. Using free capacity at another site has
also solved manufacturing bottlenecks^ (ibid.).
Although the Bcopy EXACTLY!^method started out
simply as one company’s strategy for optimizing trans
local production methods, for the WEF it is an example
and instructive blueprint for complementingmore recent
technological advances. The underlying goal for all is to
optimize process efficiency by making production less
dependent on locally oriented and situation-specific
knowledge—as when, for example, a medium-sized
company outsources an algorithm-based optimization
of its Bmilk runs^ (the intra-logistical routes by which
parts are delivered to machines on the factory floor) to a
service contractor’s data server, or when maintenance-
relevant data from countless sensors and activators in a
complex production facility are analyzed using big data
in order to prevent malfunction, or when a technology
like 3D-printing is used to shorten the time it takes to go
from prototype to series. All these are examples of a
completely new, flexible, and globally manageable
2 The BCopy EXACTLY!^ orthography, chosen by Intel, was sup-
posed to give expression to an intended, underlying Bparadigm shift.^
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division of labor, and as it becomes extended by tech-
niques such as crowd sourcing or crowd working and is
applied in different market contexts such as Bsharing^ or
Bplatform^ economies, new and highly variable constel-
lations will emerge that combine value creation and
value realization, off-line and online, and commodity
and commons in completely new ways [33]. Of course,
this kind of globally networked mode of flexible pro-
duction requires local correspondence in the specific-
ities of work organization, at least in respect to human-
machine cooperation. Humans and machines should be
as self-directing as possible but should most especially
be able to adapt to continually changing conditions of
production. The demands this model places on workers’
willingness to collaborate are high, and thus, it is not
surprising that the discussion of the democratic, partic-
ipatory firm is heating up again. Within this discussion,
the interaction between humans and machine is of par-
ticular relevance for Industrie 4.0.
It is being said that knowledge—and with it, human
work—is now important again. However, the forms of
useful knowledge and thus of human work are changing
very rapidly. Many agree that rapidly developing digital
infrastructure and years of deregulatory politics com-
bine to create a second-order effect: BThey unleash a
flood of knowledge flows on a global scale that become
more diverse and richer with each passing year.^ In this
context, the knowledge corporations need is in constant
flux. Firms cannot afford to merely conserve already-
acquired knowledge but rather need to adapt a strategy
of permanent knowledge acquisition: BNow, there is an
opportunity to learn faster and drive more rapid perfor-
mance improvement than ever before by harnessing
these knowledge flows^ ([34], p. 28).
To cite a second voice in the ongoing discussion, the
Bosch manager Siegfried Dais echoes the views of
many others when he claims that we are on the cusp of
an Belemental paradigm shift^ quite unlike the CIM
ideas of the past [35]. Dais advocates replacing older
production models based on central planning and robust
but rigid value chains with models based on
decentralized self-management and the ad hoc organi-
zation of value-creating networks ([35], p. 613). In his
estimation, we need to create an Barchitecture and rules
for a value-creating network that links millions of deci-
sion points globally, is secure and robust, and is charac-
terized by high availability^ ([35], p. 633).
At one point, Dais asseverates: Bthe pace of produc-
tion will be a human pace.^ Yet, looking again at his
entire argument makes one rather skeptical about this. If
the employment of human labor is described in the same
breath as both highly flexible and dependent on exper-
tise needed in a certain span of time ([35], p. 614), the
author appears to be just paying lip service to the abil-
ities of individuals to influence the pace of production.
Note, for example, that the German logistic branch has
sent out signals that logistics 4.0 is only to be had if
changes in production sites can be undertaken with
quicker response times in the future. BThe whole thing
begins with the fact that the best location for a system
can no longer be determined on a long-term basis due to
the ever more volatile production and trade environ-
ments. There is no such thing as the ideal production
location, sometimes for many years. The logistics net-
work and its nodes must be continuously adjusted to
circumstances. Thus, the logistics nodes of the future
will have to be moveable^ ([36], p. 615). Humans and
intelligent machines increasingly melt into a Bblended
workforce^ in which technology is not just a set of
physical tools but is rather the Bnewest employee^ and
should be seen as one, indeed as a Bpartner in a new
collaborative workforceB ([37], pp. 88–89). The WEF
uses nearly identical definitions, also favoring the term
blended workforce, and characterizes Bdigital labor^ in
such a way as to make no distinction between variable
and fixed capital, between (wo)man and machine.
BDigital labor^ is a specific reference to the use of
digital technologies to take over work once done by
humans: B...smart sensors, machines (e.g., robots), or
intelligent systems that can do parts of the jobs that only
humans used to do^ ([38], p. 28).
What remains puzzling in both visions is just how all
this is going to make human work more autonomous
and decentralized as its proponents repeatedly claim. If
humans, machines, and intelligent systems are to be
transformed into a globally networked, digital-human
blended workforce ([38], p. 7) in which the individual
components are universally deployable in a highly effi-
cient, self-directed collaborative production system,
how will its human components be free to concentrate
on the Bmore human elements of their jobs like creative
problem-solving and collaboration^ ([38], p.17)?
Industrie 4.0: a Future Told, Traded, and Tamed
The immediate effects of Industrie 4.0 on the industrial
sector will be significant and far-reaching. Under no
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circumstances, however, should we lose sight of the fact
that Industrie 4.0 is at best just one phenomenon among
a wide range of disruptive global transformations. As
mechanisms of corporate control increasingly prove
unable to solve the basic problem of how to transform
purchased labor power into actually rendered work,
many prognoses and visions of the future organization
of work tell us that this problem will or ought to be
resolved through the self-direction of variable capital. It
bodes ill, however, that even as these prognoses have
spurred a renewed celebration of the Bdemocratic firm^
and Bparticipatory decision-making,^ our society is
perfecting the means of collecting massive amounts of
data on all aspects of individuals’ work-related activi-
ties, both as employees and as consumers. Is this digi-
tally augmented hollowing-out of both the private
sphere and of labor rights and the democratic potential
of industrial relations not a new form of despotism?
Here, we might observe that it is the key actors them-
selves who interpret their Industrie 4.0 plan to link
global economics to new forms of production as a
global, long-term strategy. Let us give the experts from
Deloitte the last word, again with a quote from the 2012
WEF paper:
BTo understand the future of manufacturing, we
need to explore a much broader set of dynamics
that are reshaping the global business economy.
These powerful forces have been playing out for
decades and will continue to unfold over many
decades ahead (…). We call these forces and the
trends they set inmotion the ‘Big Shift’ ([14], p. 28).
As should be clear by now, Industrie 4.0 is a central
element of this Big Shift. Building on Adam’s and
Groves’ theoretical framework and drawing empirically
on a discourse that stretches back to 2009 and includes
publications from major actors in the global economy,
this article began by debunking the myth of Industrie 4.0
as a vision formulated by German engineers. At first
glance, the discourse of Industrie 4.0 might be
interpreted as a case of visioneering—one that
Bconnects this emphasis on design, engineering, and
construction to a more distant time horizon and an
expansive view of a future determined by technology^
([2], p. 11). McCray’s perspective proved to be an
inspiring one, but other aspects of his concept of
visioneering were more difficult to observe in practice:
the discourse analysis did not associate technical
engineers with brilliant and concrete technical ideas,
nor did it identify them as individuals who use and
potentially exploit a vision of the future to attract ven-
ture capital and entice supporters. The article rather
analyzed the discourse on Industrie 4.0 as an example
of agenda building, showing which global actors are
shaping the narrative that has made the vision of
Industrie 4.0 so effective and helped it to dominate
public debate in Germany. Following Adam and
Groves, we showed that the vision is embedded in a
triple case of future-making: we first considered the
dimension of a future told and traced the global strategic
discourse that describes a new form of globally connect-
ed and almost autonomously functioning production.
Secondly, we examined the underlying idea of a future
traded, along with the perhaps misplaced hope for a new
source of unbridled growth that this technological vision
is predicted to unleash. And thirdly, we followed this
narrative towards a complementary notion of a future
tamed: a global reorganization of work that rewrites the
role of human labor.
Adam and Groves make a key distinction between the
Bembedded, embodied, contextual future from contem-
porary perspectives^—a future that, as we saw in the
BIndustrie 4.0: Understanding a Seemingly Technical
DebateB and BFuture Told: a Global Strategic DiscourseB
sections, is to some extent still contained in the future told
of Industrie 4.0—and a Bdecontextualized future emptied
of content^ ([2], p. 2). The latter is described as Bopen to
exploration and exploitation^ (in a manner we considered
in the „Future Traded: the False Hope of a New Source of
Unbridled GrowthB section under the heading future
traded) and open to Bcalculation and control,^ as detailed
in the „Future tamed: the global reorganisation of workB
section. Our analysis drew on Adam’s and Groves’ un-
derstanding of Bhow the emptying of the future is impli-
cated in both the progress of industrial-capitalist societies
and the major problems that they face today^ ([2], p. 2).
They describe the latter as open to exploration and ex-
ploitation—we followed that path in the „Future Traded:
the False Hope of a New Source of Unbridled GrowthB
section—and open to calculation and control, as shown in
the „Future tamed: the global reorganisation of workB
section. Adam andGroves inspire us with the idea of how
the „emptying of the future is implicated in both the
progress of industrial-capitalist societies and the major
problems that they face today^ ([2], p. 2).
Our sociological analysis was able to offer a number
of insights into the nature, intentions, and dynamics of
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contemporary visions of the future by finely tracing the
discourse patterns that create and transport these visions
through different societal spheres. But if sociological
analysis stops at the level of discourse, its perspective
tends to become part of what Adam and Groves call the
emptying of the future. Sociology cannot fill the sub-
stantial emptiness of a discourse by dissecting that dis-
course. But sociology can confront the emptiness of
discourse about the future with its opposite: the
embeddedness and thus materiality of work and produc-
tion today. Whatever future form of production will
become reality, it will not unfold in discourse alone; it
will take place—or not—on the shop floor and be cre-
ated and put to work by real people and their living
laboring capacity [39], within real labor relations, using
and creating real technology in all its sociomateriality
[40].
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